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INTRODUCTION
The year 2003 witnessed the fourth and final instalment of the legal saga
involving the South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club and
News Ltd. The High Court, by a four to one majority, overtumed the
decision in the Full Court of the Federal Court that South Sydney had been
excluded from the National Football League (NRL) by a term that was an
exclusionary provision under section 4D and section 45(2) of the Trade
Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The High Court's decision provides judicial
reasoning on how these sections of the Trade Practices Act are to be
interpreted and also raises the issue of the role of the Australian Consumer
and Competition Commission (ACCC) as intervener. In this case note, a
brief overview of the three Federal Court cases involving South Sydney
and News Ltd precedes an analysis of the High Court's decision.
I SOUTH SYDNEY V NEWS LTD
A Background
The case involving South Sydney and News Ltd resulted from the merging
of the Winfield Cup competition run by the Australian Rugby League
(ARL) and the Super League competition run by News Ltd. The formation
of Super League was the subject of litigation in News Limited v Australian
Rugby Football League Limited. I The decision of the case was dependent
on whether the loyalty and commitment agreements that the ARL forced
the clubs to sign were exclusionary provisions under section 45 and section
4D of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). The original trial judge,
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Burchett J, held that they did not breach section 45(2)(a) of the Act as the
loyalty and commitment agreements did not amount to an exclusionary
.. ,provISIOn.-
However, on appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court it was held that
the commitment agreements had been entered into for the purposes of
preventing the supply by the clubs of teams to other competitions, and the
acquisition by the clubs of the services of another competition organiser,
and the Court concluded that these were substantial purposes.3 It was
therefore held that there was a contravention of section 45(2)(a)(i) of the
Trade Practices Act since the agreements contained exclusionary
provisions within the meaning of section 4D of the Act.4 Another
significant conclusion of the Full Court of the Federal Court was that the
clubs were only bound to the League by their annual commitment to the
League and not by some longer term.5
This decision by the Full Court enabled Super League to be established,
but the economics of running two competitions in a small market like
Australia necessitated discussions between the ARL and News Ltd in
regard to the formation of a joint competition after just two seasons. An
announcement was subsequently made on 19 December 1997 that the ARL
and News Ltd intended to enter into an agreement that would unite their
respective competitions and form one national competition, the NRL. The
parties also agreed that the competition would over a three-year period be
reduced to 14 teams 6 - a compromise between the 16 teams suggested by
the ARL and the 12 that News Ltd had requested. It was this 14-team term
in the agreement that was central to the subsequent litigation.
As a consequence of the selection and merger process, North Sydney
failed to obtain admission to the NRL on the basis of its insolvency. When
the Gold Coast and Adelaide indicated they would not be seeking
admission, and firstly St George and Illawarra, then Wests and Balmain,
agreed to mergers, South Sydney became the only team excluded on the
basis of its ranking as the fifteenth team under the selection criteria.7 South
Sydney immediately commenced interlocutory proceedings in the Federal
Court on 12 November, with the matter being heard by Hely J.
2 News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited (1996) 135 ALR 33.
3 News Limited v Australian Rugby Football League Limited (J 996) 139 ALR 193,
249.
4 Ibid 252.
5 Ibid 282.
fi South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited v News Limited
(2000) 177 ALR 611, 620.
7 Ibid 629-30.
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B The Interlocutory Application
(2003)
The interlocutory relief sought by South Sydney was to restrain the NRL
from excluding it from the competition.8 The main points of the statement
of claim were that the 14-team term was an exclusionary provision under
section 4D and section 45 of the Trade Practices Act, and that there were
breaches of contract by the NRL. 9 The contract claims were dismissed, and
in regard to the claims under section 45 of the Act, it was the opinion of
Hely J that there was a serious question to be tried as to whether the
arrangements were made between persons who were competitive with each
other under section 4D. 1O His Honour questioned, however, whether the
14-team tenn had a proscribed purpose under section 4D(l)(b) of the
Trade Practices Act. ll
Another crucial problem in his Honour's view was the doubt as to whether
South Sydney would be able to pay subsequent damages should he grant
the interlocutory injunction being sought. l2 Hely J also noted that South
Sydney had participated in the selection process and had only commenced
legal action after being unsuccessful. l3 As his Honour concluded that
South Sydney's case was not a strong one, on the balance of convenience,
he declined to grant an injunction.
C The Federal Court Single Judge Decision
Despite the failure to secure an interlocutory injunction, South Sydney
commenced formal trial proceedings before Finn J. With regard to the
claiml4 that there were agreements between the ARL and News Ltd that
amounted to exclusionary provisions, Finn J agreed that the evidence
supported a finding that News Ltd and the ARL were not in competition
with each other in relation to competition-organising services and team
services. 15 It was his Honour's view, however, that, at the time of the 19
H South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited v News Limited
(1999) 169 ALR 120,127.
9 Ibid 126.
111 Ibid 130.
11 Ibid 131.
12 Ibid 148.
13 Ibid 139.
14 Note that the breach of contract argument that had been raised in the
interlocutory application, as well as breach of s 52 of the TPA, were both argued.
Both were dismissed by Finn J.
15 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited v News Limited
(2000) 177 ALR 611,654.
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December understanding, they were in actual competItIon in regard to
entertainment services. 16 The intention of the parties was to secure an
enhancement in the quality of those services. I? Therefore, even if the
exclusion of a team would involve the foreseeable loss of fans, a purpose
of the 14-team term in the 19 December understanding was not to deprive
those fans of the supply of entertainment services. 18 Thus, Finn J was of
the opinion that the 14-team term had no purpose other than one of
achieving a viable and sustainable national competition.
On the question as to what constituted a class of persons, Finn J's view
was that there was no section 4D(l) class; there was, at best, a class
defined only by the characteristic of not being selected to participate in the
2000 competition. Finn J's opinion was that the 14-team term was not of
the proscribed type alleged by South Sydney. His Honour also noted that
the NRL could still determine what teams it would admit into the
competition. South Sydney, therefore, had no right to be admitted, and
even if it could not be excluded in reliance of the 14-team term, it could
still be excluded by any other lawful reason. 19
D The Full Court of the Federal Court Decision
Undaunted by its second failure in the courts, South Sydney launched an
appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court, with the only challenge to
Finn J's judgment being in regard to the 14-team term not being an
exclusionary provision. 20 As Merkel J noted, the two issues were in regard
to the purpose and the particular class of persons.21
In Moore J's view, central to the claim made by South Sydney was that the
14-team term was a provision of the proscribed type.22 His Honour was
satisfied that it had been a substantial purpose operating in December 1997
on clubs who had competed in the two competitions during the winter of
that year. The central question then posed by section 4D(1)(b) was whether
a substantial purpose of the 14-team term was to effect a restriction or
1(, Ibid 657.
17 Ibid 658.
18 Ibid 678.
19 Ibid 682.
20 For a casenote on the Full Court of the Federal Court decision see C Davies,
'Souths v News Ltd', (2001) 8 JCULR 121-9.
21 South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Limited v News Limited
(2001) 181 ALR 188,246.
22 Ibid 218.
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limitation.23 Moore J held that as the services to be acquired by the
operation of the 14-team term would not be the same as those acquired
when there were two competitions, there was such a limitation and
restriction of the services.24
Merkel J was also of the opinion that Finn J had failed to distinguish
between the purpose of the club merger, joint venture and regional
participation provisions and the purpose of the 14-team term.25 In Merkel
1's view, while the creation of a viable national competition was the
ultimate end purpose of that term, its immediate purpose was to exclude
clubs.26 Since the 14-team term had been dogmatically insisted upon by
News Ltd, and agreed to by the ARL, it was clear that the exclusionary
purpose of the provision was a significant operative purpose and therefore
a substantive one.27
In his dissenting judgment Heerey J stated that critical to Finn 1's findings
was the state of mind of those making the decisions, namely that none had
wanted or sought to have Souths excluded from the 2000 competition.28
His Honour also expressed the view that while it was foreseeable that
clubs would be excluded, the recognition of a possible outcome detracting
from the desired purpose does not alter the nature of the purpose.29
Moore J stated, in regard to the issue of whether there was a particular
class involved, that the provision would only be an exclusionary provision
if it was to operate on identified or identifiable persons, but not if it only
operated on the generality of persons.30 The expression 'particular class of
persons', in his opinion, referred to identified or identifiable persons, but
as his Honour concluded that the 1997 clubs were particular persons, it
was unnecessary to consider the contention that the 14-team term
represented a particular class.31 The view of Merkel J, however, was that
there was such a class: top-level rugby league clubs that were eligible to
participate but that had not met the requisite level in the selection criteria.
23 Ibid 230.
24 Ibid 231.
25 Ibid 251.
2(, Ibid 254.
27 Ibid 255.
28 Ibid 203.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid 234-5.
31 Ibid 237.
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Thus, the clubs had a distinguishing or identifying characteristic in
addition to the mere fact of exclusion.32
On the matter of identity it was the view of Heerey J that a particular class
cannot be defined by the mere fact of exclusion as this would mean that, in
effect, the class would become the whole world as anybody would then
have the potential to be excluded.33
E The High Court Decision
After the Full Court of the Federal Court had overturned the original
decision of Justice Finn, News Ltd was granted special leave to appeal to
the High Court. By a majority of four to one (Gleeson CJ, McHugh,
Gummow, Callinan JJ; Kirby J dissenting), the decision of the primary
judge was restored.
1. The Majority
Gleeson CJ commented on the organisation of sporting competitions,
noting that, like most sporting competitions, both the Super League
competition and the Winfield Cup run by the ARL were, of their nature,
exclusive as they were not open to any club which wished to join the
competition.3~ Thus, if a greater number of clubs wished to compete than
competition organisers were willing to accept, exclusion was inevitable.35
His Honour also pointed out that rugby league was only one form of
sporting contest that competed for the attention of the public36, and that the
need for the united competition was based on commercial reasons.3?
In regard to section 45 of the Trade Practices Act, Gleeson Cl noted that
the real question to be addressed by Finn J was whether the 14-team term
used by the NRL was included for the purpose of preventing, restricting or
limiting the supply of goods or services from particular persons or classes
of persons. His Honour pointed out that Justice Finn had answered this
question in the negative38, and also noted that in section 4D there is a
significant difference between effect and purpose. It was the subjective
purpose of News Ltd and the ARL in including the 14-team term - that is,
3Z Ibid 259.
33 Ibid 207.
3~ News Ltd v South Sydney District Rugby League Football Club Ltd (2003) 77
ALJR 1515,1517.
3, Ibid 1519.
36 Ibid 1518.
37 Ibid 1517.
38 Ibid 1519.
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what they had in mind - that had to be determined.39 Gleeson CJ agreed
with Finn J that it was possible to think of circumstances in which the
selection of the clubs could demonstrate a purpose which had as its
objective a particular club. This, in his Honour's opinion, was not the
situation in the case, and it was, from a legal perspective, no different from
choosing the clubs by lot. Specifying the number of clubs that were to be
admitted to participate in the new competition was simply a necessary part
of the definition of the new business venture, and therefore the 14-team
term was not aimed at Souths, or any club.40 As the purpose of the 14-team
term was not to exclude any particular club or clubs, or limit or restrict the
supply of services,41 it was deemed to be legal by the Chief Justice. His
Honour also noted that News Ltd and the ARL were under no legal
obligation to accept any particular clubs to participate in the new
competition.42
The main point addressed in McHugh r s judgment was whether the term
'purpose' in section 4D meant that it was the subjective purpose of News
Ltd and the ARL that had to be examined, or whether the purpose of the
parties was to be determined objectively, without reference to their mental
states. If it was the subjective purpose then the findings of Finn J
compelled the conclusion that News Ltd and the ARL did not have the
purpose that was alleged by Souths.43 McHugh J pointed out that since
1986 the Federal Court had accepted that the test of purpose in section 4D
was a subjective one,44 but noted the problems in determining whether the
purpose is subjective or objective due to the contrasting wording of
sections 4D and 4F. It was his Honour's opinion that the terms of section
4D tend to suggest an objective purpose because it refers to the purpose of
the provision, not to the purpose of those who actually made the provision.
On the other hand section 4F(l )(b), which refers to a person, and section
4F(l )(a), which refers to the purpose to which the provision was included,
suggest a subjective test,45
Justice McHugh went on to state that if section 4D was being interpreted
for the first time he would conclude that the test was objective. His Honour
accepted, however, that it was impossible to hold that the subjective
interpretation was plainly wrong, and as the Federal Court had approved
39 Ibid 1520.
411 Ibid.
41 Ibid 1521.
4" Ibid 1522.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid. His Honour here referred to the judgment of Deane J in Hughes v Western
Australian Cricket Association (1986) 19 FCR 10, 38.
45 Ibid 1523.
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such a test for 17 years, he was not willing to overrule the subjective
interpretation of the section:t6 As his Honour noted, questions of
construction can generate opposing answers, none of which are clearly
right or wrong, as frequently there is simply no right answer to the
question of construction. Section 40 of the Trade Practices Act, in his
Honour's view, fell into this category.47 Thus, given the facts found by
Finn J and the application of the subjective test, the appeal by News Ltd
was allowed by McHugh J.48
Justice Gummow stated that he was in general agreement with the
approach to the issue of construction of the Trade Practices Act taken by
both Justice Finn and Justice Heerey.49 His Honour also noted that section
40(1) contains two relevant primary elements, namely the character of the
relevant actors and the purpose of the provision. In relation to the question
of purpose Justice Gummow noted that section 40 refers to the purpose of
the contract, arrangement or understanding, rather than any deleterious
effect that it may have on competition.50 His Honour also suggested that
the wording of section 4F requires examination of the purposes of the
individuals who included the provision, and that a provision may be
included for a number of reasons, and in such circumstances, the relevant
purpose must be 'substantial' .51 Gummow J then agreed with Finn J that
the 14-team term had not been included for the purpose of preventing the
supply of competition organising services or the acquisition of team
services, and therefore the 14-team term did not satisfy the second of the
two primary elements of section 40. This conclusion, in his Honour's
opinion, was sufficient to uphold the appea1.52
In regard to the question of particular class, it was held by his Honour that
there can be such a group, even if at anyone time the identity of all its
members is not readily ascertainable.53 Justice Gummow then pointed out
that the critical point was not found in pondering such questions as the
defining characteristics that make a class particular. What was more
important was the notion that a selection process involving more
applicants than available positions will necessarily result in 'winners' and
'losers'. In his Honour's opinion there was an absence in the evidence of
46 Ibid 1524.
47 Ibid.
48 Ibid 1525.
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid 1526.
51 Ibid 1527.
52 Ibid 1528.
53 Ibid 1529.
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indications that the purpose of the 14-team term was to prevent the supply
of services to or the acquisition of services from the clubs which, under the
operation of the selection process, would turn out to be one of the
'losers' .54
Justice Callinan examined the reasoning behind the NRL wanting a 14-
team term, noting that it enabled the competition to have a regular season
where each team played each other twice, and that it would help to
establish a financially stable national competition of the highest possible
standard.55 Like Gleeson CJ, his Honour noted that rugby league also
competes with the other codes of football for players, sponsors and
spectators.56
His Honour then examined the judgment of Finn J, and agreed that an
exclusionary provision was one that would have made Souths a target for
exclusion in a selection process designed to produce such an outcome,
rather than merely being the unsuccessful contender in a selection process
which did not pre-ordain that outcome.57 Justice Callinan, noting that
Heerey J had referred to passages in Finn 1's judgment which indicated
that the primary judge had carefully distinguished between purpose and
effect,58 went on to say that he was in general agreement with the
reasoning of Justice Finn. 59 His Honour then stated that a provision did not
have to be read in isolation as sometimes ascertaining its true meaning
required that it be read in the context of the whole agreement or
arrangement, and in his Honour's opinion, Justice Finn had not failed to
distinguish between the purpose of the 14-team term and the purpose of
the merger provisions as a whole.60 Justice Callinan also concluded that as
the case was concerned with the prevention of supply, a class cannot be
defined by the mere fact of non-supply or exclusion, and that Souths was
not a particular person or member of a class for the purposes of section
4DY
2. The Minori ty
Kirby J noted at the outset of his judgment that this was a case where once
again he was in disagreement with the majority of the High Court who had
again adopted a more limited application of the Trade Practices Act than
54 Ibid J530.
55 Ibid 1545.
56 Ibid 1556.
57 Ibid 1551.
58 Ibid 1553.
59 Ibid 1556.
60 Ibid 1557.
(,1 Ibid 1557-8.
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that taken by the Full Court of the Federal Court.62 His Honour went on to
point out that the task of the courts is to give effect to an Act according to
the purpose that is expressed in the language of the statute, and, in his
opinion, the majority judges in the Full Court had simply given effect to
the purpose of Parliament as disclosed in the words adopted. They were
therefore couect to construe it as they did, namely as a wide Act.63
However, Justice Kirby was of the opinion that the judges of the Federal
Court were wrong in their application of a subjective test, but that in the
present case this did not constitute a critical error.64
Justice Kirby stated that the two issues in the case were whether the
majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court had erred in concluding that
the 14-team term had a proscribed purpose, and that Souths had constituted
a 'particular class of persons' .65
In regard to the question of purpose, the issue was not whether the overall
objective of the auangement was rational or beneficial or in the best
interests of the game, supporters or sport generally. It also did not involve
the question of whether, subjectively, the people involved in running rugby
league had hoped or expected to avoid the exclusion of a traditionally
successful team like Souths. The only issue was the purpose of the
impugned clause that contained the exclusionary provision that limited the
number of teams in the competition.66 His Honour also held that in
ascertaining the purpose of the provision, it was critical to focus on the
provision in its context, as that was what the language of the Trade
Practices Act required. Justice Kirby then held that when the attention of
the decision making was focused in this precise way, the only conclusion
that could be reached was that the 14-team term was an exclusionary
provision. Justice Kirby was also of the opinion that such a conclusion
would also be reached even if the sporting context of the case was
removed. He reasoned that the 'best interests of the market' argument
would not protect other business competitors under the Act, so why should
it protect News Ltd and the ARL.67
In regard to the issue of particular classes of persons, Justice Kirby held
that there was a clearly identifiable class, namely the club or clubs that
62 Ibid 1531.
63 Ibid 1538. Justice Kirby also made cntlclsm of commentators who had
themselves criticised the majority in the Full Court of the Federal Court, pointing
out that the majority had merely been interpreting the words of the statute.
64 Ibid 1539.
65 Ibid 1540.
(,(, Ibid 1542.
67 Ibid.
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were 'supernumerary to 14', and which would therefore lose the right to
supply and acquire services in the relevant market in 2000.68 Justice Kirby
also agreed with Justice Gummow that there were dangers in dissecting the
concepts in the Trade Practices Act, and reading them in isolation. Instead
they represented a compound idea with each word and phrase taking its
meaning from the entire provision.69
It should be noted that despite Justice Kirby's conclusion that section 45(2)
of the Trade Practices Act had a wide operation in regard to exclusionary
provisions, he also pointed out that specific exceptions were envisaged,
and that specific authorisation could be obtained from the ACCC. His
Honour noted that the public benefit relevant to such an authorisation by
the ACCC included the achievement of efficiencies, rationalisation or
financial viability, but when the merger parties pressed on without
authorisation, their arrangement was governed by the Trade Practices
Act.70
I I ACCC AS INTERVENER
The ACCC also successfully sought special leave to intervene in the
appeal.71 Gummow J noted that the ACCC submitted that both the
subjective purpose of the parties and objective purpose of the provision are
relevant when determining whether or not the provision falls within
section 4D. His Honour, however, stated that such a construction was not
the product of reasoned statutory interpretation, and fell foul of the
provisions in section 4F.72
It was also submitted by the ACCC that if the clear and foreseeable effect
of a provision is to prevent, restrict or limit supply, then it is open to a
finding that a substantial purpose of the provision is to prevent, restrict or
limit supply. This claim, however, was rejected by Justice Callinan73 , as
was the claim that Finn and Heerey JJ had adopted too narrow a
construction of the expression 'particular classes of persons' .74 Justice
68 Ibid 1544.
69 Ibid 1543.
70 Ibid. For a discussion on the possible use of authorisation see C Davies, 'News
Ltd v ARL, South Sydney v News Ltd - and the Question of Authorisation
Under s 88 of the Trade Practices Act' (2002) 10 Trade Practices Law Journal
215-25.
71 Ibid 1533.
72 Ibid 1527.
73 Ibid 1558.
74 Ibid 1559.
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Callinan also stated that if the ACCC had wished to attack the arrangement
it should have done so at the time of the proposed merger, and that
intervention could have been sought at or before the trial itself. In the
circumstances, therefore, it was his Honour's opinion that the ACCC
should not have been permitted to intervene and to argue the issues it
raised.75
CONCLUSION
The High Court's decision strongly supported that of the primary judge,
Justice Finn. The significance of the case lies in the High Court's
interpretation of section 4D and section 45 of the Trade Practices Act and
in the effect the Act may have in detennining how governing bodies of
sporting organisations can make decisions regarding the running of their
competitions.
With regard to the interpretation of the Trade Practices Act, the High
Court's decision confirmed the long-established view of the Full Court of
the Federal Court that a subjective test should be applied in assessing
whether a provision is an exclusionary one under the Act. However, Kirby
J's dissent and McHugh J's reservations on this matter should also be
noted. In relation to the question of what constitutes a class under section
4D(I), Justice Callinan held that it cannot be defined by the mere fact of
non-supply or exclusion. Gummow, Kirby and Callinan JJ all held that a
provision did not have to be read in isolation, but instead should be placed
in the context of the agreement as a whole. The decision, it is suggested,
also indicates that the ACCC, if it wishes to be effective as an intervener in
a case involving exclusionary provisions, needs to take action at an earlier
point in the proceedings.
The High Court overturned the decision of the Full Court that appeared to
dictate to organisers of sporting competitions how their sport should be
organised. Sporting organisations, as corporate entities, must still comply
with the requirements of the Trade Practices Act jf they choose to employ
an agreement that may fall within the meaning of section 4D and section
45. However, the High Court decision means that, as long as the subjective
intent of any agreement is not, for instance, designed to exclude certain
teams, then the agreement will be valid under the Act.
It is also suggested that the decision does not take away the opinion of
Finn J that even if the 14-team term was an excJusionary provision, Souths
could have been excluded by other legal means. The implied one-year
contract that had been held to exist in the News Limited v Australian Rugby
75 Ibid.
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Football League Limited would appear to have been one such method as
this implied term allows organisers to invite clubs to compete in their
competition on a yearly basis. It is further submitted that the High Court
decision does not alter what was also held in News Limited v Australian
Rugby Football League Limited, namely that the loyalty agreements used
by the ARL to try and prevent teams defecting to Super League were an
exclusionary provision.
Finally, an unusual aspect of the High Court appeal was that News Ltd
made it clear before the proceedings began that it would not seek to
remove Souths from the competition should the decision be made in its
favour, Thus the proceedings before the High Court could be viewed as
nothing more than an academic exercise. However, News Ltd's wish to
take the matter to the High Court might indicate that News Ltd may, at
some time in the future, seek to reduce the number of teams in the NRL. If
so, a clarification on the legality of the 14-team term was far from a mere
academic exercise as the decision would allow it to use a similar provision
in order to reduce the number of teams. This author has reservations as to
whether the NRL is sustainable in its present IS-team format, given the
competition from both the Australian Football League (AFL) and rugby
union for players, spectators and the sponsorship dollar. For that reason the
High Court decision may well prove to be an important one for News Ltd
in its role as a partner in the NRL.
